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Gerrit J. Knaap
Some fifteen years ago, Kota Ambon, the capital of the Indonesian province of Maluku, 
commemorated its fourth centennial. Kota Ambon today is inhabited by a large Indonesian 
population, including Christian and Muslim Ambonese as well as Muslim immigrants from 
elsewhere, mainly from Sulawesi. The proportion of non-Ambonese migrants is high. The 
Ambonese themselves still prefer to live in the countryside, which is understandable be­
cause the city is overcrowded and living conditions are far from comfortable. The immi­
grant in Kota Ambon is, however, not a modern phenomenon. The city has always had a 
large proportion of non-Ambonese settlers.
In this article, I discuss the development of Kota Ambon in the first 130 years of its exis­
tence and demonstrate that Kota Ambon developed into a non-Ambonese city, situated in 
an Ambonese countryside.1 In recent years, the "early" colonial city in Southeast Asia has 
been a topic of increasing interest to historians. In this respect, Kota Ambon should not be 
overlooked, not only because it was one of the first colonial cities but also because the 
archival sources allow a systematic analysis of matters in greater detail than has yet been 
possible for settlements elsewhere. The physical appearance of the town, its institutions and 
government, and its economic and demographic structure will be compared with the results 
of other research that has been published in the last decade. Kota Ambon, although it had 
several features in common with other early colonial cities, also possessed unique character­
istics of its own.
Like many other cities in the world, Kota Ambon originated from a settlement outside 
the walls of a fortress. This fortress was founded in 1576 by the Portuguese, who needed a 
new stronghold after they were expelled from the island of Temate in the North Moluccas 
by Sultan Baab Ullah in 1575. The new fortress was situated on Honibopo beach, which was 
part of the territory of the village of Ahusu, one of the Ambonese allies of the Portuguese. It 
was constructed from stone and named "Nossa Senhora da Anunciada." Around the
1 All archival sources used for this article originate from the Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA) in The Hague, in par­
ticular from the collection of the Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie [abbreviated hereafter as VOC]. The ab­
breviation "res." refers to a resolution of the Political Council in the province of Ambon. "Zielsbeschr." refers to 
"zielsbeschrijving" (description of souls) and "dagregister Victoria" to the daily register kept in Castle Victoria.
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fortress casados, former Portuguese soldiers who had married in Asia and had chosen to stay 
there, settled. In times of crisis, they served as a militia to assist the garrison of the Portu­
guese Crown against its opponents. Besides the casados, several Christian Ambonese vil­
lages supportive of the Portuguese cause had grown up near the fortress for protection 
against attack from the Tematan-led anti-Portuguese Muslim coalition. One of these villages 
consisted of orang merdeka, Asian Christians, who had followed the Portuguese from the 
North Moluccas to Ambon in 1575. These orang merdeka may have been indigenous North 
Moluccans, but it is also possible that they were former slaves who had been given their 
freedom by their masters; orang merdeka means "free people."2
The settlement witnessed a constant state of war in the first three decades of its exis­
tence. It sustained serious attacks in 1591,1593, and 1598. The opponents usually were Am­
bonese Muslims, who received considerable backing from Ternatan and/or Javanese forces. 
In 1600, the Muslims were also assisted by Dutch ships under the command of Steven van 
der Haghen. The Dutch had come to Ambon in search of spices, in particular cloves. On 
each of these occasions the Portuguese held their position, but on February 23, 1605, when 
Steven van der Haghen returned on behalf of the "Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie" 
(VOC), the Dutch East India Company, accompanied by a fleet of ten ships, the desperate 
governor, Gaspar de Melo, surrendered the fortress and all its dependencies in the Central 
Moluccas to the Dutch. On this occasion, the Dutch, for the first time since they had arrived 
in Asia, acquired sovereign rights, and as such the acquisition of the Ambon fortress marked 
the beginning of their colonial empire.3
Although Steven van der Haghen guaranteed freedom of religion to the Catholic Portu­
guese, this tolerance did not last long. In March 1605, the Portuguese governor, together 
with several of his officials, soldiers, and their families, a group several hundred strong, 
sailed in two ships to Melaka. The following May, 250 of the remaining Portuguese, includ­
ing the Jesuit missionaries and perhaps some orang merdeka, also had to leave, in this case 
for the Philippines. Altogether, approximately 600 Portuguese inhabitants had to leave. 
Only 46 Portuguese-influenced Asian or mestizo families pledged their allegiance to the 
Dutch and stayed behind, i.e. approximately 200-300 persons in all.4
A preindustrial European "city," in modern terminology, is considered to be a phe­
nomenon to which some spatial, economic, judicial, and institutional characteristics can be 
ascribed. Generally, a city is labeled as a settlement that (1) is rather crowded and enclosed 
with walls and/or ditches for its defense, (2) has a population with mainly nonagrarian 
specializations that to a certain extent dominates the surrounding countryside, (3) has a 
population whose judicial status contrasts to that of the inhabitants of the countryside, par­
ticularly in the sense that a city dweller has more rights or privileges than a villager, and (4) 
is a political entity with self-governing institutions that have reached a fairly high degree of
2 H.Th.M. Jacobs, "Wanneer werd de stad Ambon gesticht? Bij een vierde eeuwfeest," Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- 
en Volkenkunde 131 (1975): 447,451, 453-54,456-57.
3 H.Th.M. Jacobs, 'The Portuguese Town of Ambon 1576-1605," Paper presented to the Second International 
Seminar on Indo-Portuguese History, Lisbon, October 1980, p. 11; G. J. Knaap, Kruidnagelen en Christenen. De 
Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie en de bevolking van Ambon 1656-1696, Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Insti- 
tuut voor Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde 125 (Dordrecht: Foris, 1987), p. 15.
4 1. Commelin, Begin ende Voortgangh van de Vereenigde Nederlantsche Geoctroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie, vol. 2, 
(Amsterdam: Janszoon, 1646), voyage 12, p. 36; P. A. Tiele, ed., "Documenten voor de geschiedenis der Neder- 
landers in het Oosten," Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap 6 (1883): 285,289; H.Th.M Jacobs, 
ed., Documenta Malucensia, vol. 2., Monumenta Missionum Societatis Iesu 39 (Rome: Institutum Historicum Socie- 
tatis Iesu, 1980), pp. 681, 690.
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autonomy vis-a-vis the ruler of the realm. According to Anthony Reid, precolonial cities in 
Southeast Asia were quite different. Southeast Asian cities were settlements in which living 
space was not in short supply and which usually lacked walls and ditches. Its population, 
although heavily dependent on nonagricultural professions, had no special judicial status, 
and forms of self-government were limited to foreign merchants living in separate quarters 
of the town.5 Actually, a city was a cluster of villagelike settlements surrounding a court or a 
harbor.
The colonial capitals of Southeast Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such 
as Melaka, Manila, and Batavia, very much resembled European cities, with the exception of 
the fourth characteristic; that is, although some features of autonomy, such as self-govern­
ment for certain groups of foreign merchants as in indigenous Southeast Asian cities, were 
found, it is obvious that the "lord of the realm," in this case the representative(s) of the Por­
tuguese or Spanish Crown or the authorities of the VOC, dominated the institutions of the 
town.
Kota Ambon fits into this adapted European pattern except for the first characteristic, 
the spatial one. Although Kota Ambon was a rather crowded place, situated in the coastal 
valley at the mouth of the Rivers Wai Gajah and Wai Tomo, it had no city walls or ditches 
surrounding it. Economically, the nonagricultural element was dominant in the settlement, 
in particular in the field of trade relations wherein it had a clear advantage over the coun­
tryside. Its population had a special judicial status when compared with the inhabitants of 
the villages. It consisted of servants of the VOC and "colonists" or burgers (citizens). The 
group of citizens, in principle at least, had to serve the state, the VOC, by forming armed 
militias that could assist the Company's standing army in the event of emergency. The vil­
lagers or orang negeri, on the other hand, were obliged to serve the colonial state with 
"compulsory services" in the sense that they had to carry Company servants, letters, and 
provisions, man the fleet of indigenous war vessels, the so-called hongi, and help build the 
Company's fortresses.6 Kota Ambon, however, was not an autonomous political entity be­
cause it had no government of its own; the city was administered by the local VOC governor 
and council.
These criteria excluded the villagers from being part of the city. The Ambonese villages 
that were found on the coastal plain of the Wai Tomo and the Wai Gajah, such as Soya di 
Bawah, Nusaniwe, Latuhalat, Urimesen, Halong, Amahusu, and Hatiwe, are considered to 
be nonurban. This label is also applied to the settlements of Mardika and Batu Merah. 
Mardika's population consisted of the descendants of a sixteenth-century group of orang 
merdeka. Although its population possessed scarcely any land, it was still obliged to per­
form compulsory services like all other Ambonese villages. More or less the same was true 
for Batu Merah, which began in 1656 as a place to hold hostage defeated Ambonese enemies 
of the VOC. Gradually, Batu Merah developed into a real village; its inhabitants, like those 
of Mardika, were considered to be orang negeri and not citizens.7
Appearance of the City
The most outstanding building in Kota Ambon, which dominated one's outlook when 
approaching the town by sea or by land, was the castle. Throughout VOC rule in Ambon,
5 A. Reid, 'The Structure of Cities in Southeast Asia, Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries," Journal o f Southeast 
Asian Studies 9 (1980): 240-42,247.
6 Knaap, Kruidnagelen, pp. 138-60.
7 Ibid., pp. 272,301.
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the Dutch were busy improving the construction of the castle to keep it in a good state of de­
fense. A full account of its building history would fill several pages; consequently, only the 
most important events are dealt with here. When the Dutch took over, the castle was a brick 
rectangle that was very vulnerable to damage by enemy gunfire. Thus in 1605-1606, it was 
encircled by a small ditch and small bulwarks were erected at its comers. In 1614, it received 
a new name, Victoria, to commemorate the seizure of Ambon from the Portuguese. In the 
early 1630s, the ditch was broadened and the consequent available soil was used to 
strengthen the fortress walls. In 1654, Victoria was enlarged on the seaside because it had 
become too small for the ever-growing activities of the Dutch.8
In the beginning of the 1670s, probably because the VOC felt vulnerable confronted as it 
was with the war of the Netherlands against the combined forces of England and France, a 
discussion began about the defensive merits of the castle. They even contemplated building 
an entirely new castle in another place. However, on February 17, 1674, the castle and the 
city were struck by the most severe earthquake of the century and the castle buildings were 
severely damaged. As a result, the VOC had to buy a house in town to serve as a temporary 
residence for the governor and his family, but the temporary residence turned out to be 
permanent. The next major project concerning the castle began in 1679: a stone encirclement 
was built outside the walls, and new ditches were dug facing the landside. This encircle­
ment, which was in turn protected by a small ditch, was completed in 1682. In the 1680s, the 
question of whether a new castle should be built gained new impetus. Finally, in 1697 they 
definitely decided to stay at the old site.9
When the Dutch took over from the Portuguese, there were four buildings used for 
Christian religious purposes in the vicinity of the castle, two of which served as churches for 
the Ambonese village populations. Of the last two, probably wooden structures, nothing 
further is heard after 1605. The other two, St Paul's and the Misericordia, were obviously 
meant to serve the Portuguese garrison and the urban population: the first as a parish 
church and the second as a hospital. The Misericordia probably was a hospital under the 
Dutch as well until a new building was constmcted for this purpose in the period 1625- 
1630. St. Paul's was turned into a Protestant Calvinist church, where sermons for both the 
Dutch- and the Malay-speaking congregations were read. At the end of the 1620s, however, 
the already shaky building fell down after a storm. On its site, a new stone building was 
erected to serve both congregations. Another small church must also have been built inside 
the castle for the garrison in the first half of the seventeenth century. A fundamental segre­
gation between the Dutch- and Malay-speaking religious communities only came about, 
however, after the city church burned in the great fire of 1658. On that occasion, the VOC 
decided that the ever-growing communities should each have its own place of worship. 
Temporarily, the Dutch-speaking community attended services in the small church of the 
castle while a special wooden structure was erected for the Malay community on the site of 
the old burned building. A new church for the Dutch was built in the 1680s, just opposite
8 G. E. Rumphius, "De Ambonsche Historie behelsende een kort verhaal," Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en 
Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie, 64 (1910), pt. 1: 25, 82; idem, pt. 2: 74; W. Ph. Coolhaas, ed., Generate missiven 
van gouverneurs-generaal en raden van Indie aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Rijks 
Geschiedkundige Publication 104 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960), 1:35; G. J. Knaap, ed., Memories van overgave van 
gouverneurs van Ambon in de zeventiende en achttiende eeuw, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publication, Kleine Serie 62 
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1987), p. 3.
9 VOC 1293: 61r; 1300: 34r-35r, 54r, 494v res.; 1344:127 res.; 1376: 52v; W. Ph. Coolhaas, ed., Generate missiven van 
gouverneurs-generaal en raden van Indie aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Rijks Geschied­
kundige Publication 134 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), 4: 602-3; idem, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publication 150 (The 
Hague: Nijhoff, 1975), 5:389, 825.
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the house of the governor in town. A new stone building replaced the wooden structure of 
the Malay church in 1696 at the old site.10
When the Dutch took the city in 1605, most of the inhabitants' houses were situated 
directly adjacent to the castle. From a military point of view, the houses stood far too near 
the castle. Therefore, the Dutch immediately started town planning, among other things, by 
moving the houses a few hundred meters southward, thus creating an open space between 
the castle and the town. The next change must have occurred around 1625. The number of 
citizens had grown considerably and the sea had eroded a large portion of the coast. The 
Ambonese villages were thus obliged to move to the periphery of the coastal valley, while 
the urban citizens gradually had to fill in the space between these villages on the one hand 
and the castle and seashore on the other. At the end of the seventeenth century, Kota Am­
bon's street pattern had reached its final structure, which can still be traced today. 
Olifantsstraat (Elephant Street), which went from the castle southeast toward the moun­
tains, corresponds with today's Jalan Patimura, and Chinese straat (Chinese Street) with 
Jalan Alexander Jacob Patty. Breede straat (Broad Street) on the seaside is probably identical 
with Jalan Kemakmuran, whereas Prince straat (Prince Street) and Mardijkersstraat 
(Mardijkers' Street) corresponds with Jalan Sultan Hairun and Jalan Telukabesi, respec­
tively.11
In the 1620s, attempts were made to register property rights to land and houses. How­
ever, because of the negligence of both the authorities and the inhabitants, it was not until 
the 1680s that a reasonably adequate cadastral administration was established.12 What did 
these houses look like? Usually, the walls of the bigger houses were made of stone up to a 
height of 1.5 m; above this level they were of wood. The roofs were thatched with palm 
leaves. The smaller houses, pedak, were entirely wooden structures. In the 1640s, to direct 
house building in a more or less orderly fashion, the VOC nominated a rooimeester, a kind of 
building inspector. Every potential builder was obliged to ask the inspector, who was 
always a Company employee, for permission and to let the inspector decide on building 
boundaries. The inspector also supervised the condition of the town's streets, which not 
only functioned as traffic lanes but also served as drains. In the rainy season in particular, 
tremendous quantities of water came down from the mountains to the sea. This water was 
supposed to find its way not only through the rivers but also through the small ditches 
along both sides of the streets. Each householder was responsible for the upkeep of the 
ditches in front of his or her dwelling. The ditches were always in danger of being blocked 
by animals, especially pigs, which ran free and fouled the streets, and humans, who de­
posited all sorts of garbage. The rooimeester had to see that the streets and the ditches were 
kept in good shape and that everyone carried the garbage to the places allotted for that pur­
pose near the seashore.13
As the duties of the rooimeester gradually increased, he was assisted by wijkmeesters, 
overseers of city blocks, who were chosen from the ranks of the citizenry. The Company had
10 Knaap, M emories, p. 7; Rumphius, "Ambonsche Historic," pt. 1: 51, 77; pt. 2 :119 ; J. Mooij, Geschiedenis der 
Protestantsche Kerk in Nederlandsch-Indie 1602-1636 (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1923), p. 213; Fr. Valentijn, Oud 
en Nieuw Oost-IndiSn, vol. 2 (Dordrecht: Van Braam, 1724), Beschrijvinge van Amboina [hereafter cited as 
Beschr.], pp. 130-33; VOC 1243:1102.
11 Rumphius, "Ambonsche Historic," pt. 1: 53; Knaap, Memories, p. 11; Valentijn, Oost-Indien, Beschr., pp. 125-26, 
134.
12 Rumphius, "Ambonsche Historic," pt. 1: 53; Valentijn, Oost-Indien, Ambonsche Zaaken [hereafter cited as 
Amb. Z.J, p. 252; Knaap, Memories, p. 250.
13 Valentijn, Oost-Indien, Beschr., pp. 126-27; Amb. Z., pp. 251-53.
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already divided the town into four blocks in 1666. The four wijkmeesters had to see that the 
inhabitants disposed of their garbage in the proper places and that they kept six to twenty 
bamboo cylinders at hand, according to the size of their houses, each filled with five liters of 
water for mutual assistance in case of fire. Moreover, the rooimeester and the wijkmeesters 
also had to see that no one distilled arak, i.e., locally produced spirits, or coconut oil in a 
house that was considered too small for that purpose. Nevertheless, after the great fires of 
1686 and 1687, when whole streets were reduced to ashes, Governor Robert Padtbrugge 
ordered that first, all houses must be built at least three meters apart and, second, that all 
roofs must be made with tiles. The fulfillment of the first obligation, in particular, caused 
great difficulty for those owners who had built their houses on relatively small pieces of 
land.14
Portuguese Kota Ambon had not possessed defensive works such as town walls and 
ditches. The Dutch at first left it that way. The Company was of the opinion that serious 
enemies would only approach Kota Ambon by sea. There the castle already provided pro­
tection. Enemies from the mountains were not expected. However, on two occasions, in 1616 
and 1636, the Ambonese Christians from the hinterland rose up against the Company and 
threatened the city, although in the end no full-scale attacks followed. Nevertheless, in 1636, 
the threat resulted in the erection of a temporary wooden encirclement of the city. In 1665, 
when there were rumors of a Makassarese attack on Ambon, the city was again surrounded 
by such a temporary construction. Finally, in the 1680s, Governor Padtbrugge gave the city 
its moats and ditches, which were only realized by using large-scale compulsory labor from 
the Ambonese villagers. The complaints about these excessive labor duties were one of the 
reasons that Padtbrugge was summoned back to Batavia by the High Government in 1687. 
Within a few months of Padtbrugge's departure, Ambon was struck by heavy rains that left 
his moats and bulwarks in very bad condition. In June the following year, the rains struck 
again with the result that the works were irretrievably destroyed. After this failure, no effort 
was made again to fortify the city.15
Governing the City
In VOC times, a separate Kota Ambon government did not exist. The body that gov­
erned the province of Amboina, that is Ambon island and the surrounding archipelago, the 
Political Council, also made the major decisions concerning the town's administration. The 
council resided at the castle and, at the end of the seventeenth century, consisted of the gov­
ernor, who was the head of the council, the opperkoopman (senior merchant), who was the 
head of the internal VOC administration, the captain, who was the leader of the garrison, 
thefiscaal (an attorney or judge), and the garrison bookkeeper. Whenever present in town, 
the rulers of the districts of Hitu and Saparua also attended the sessions of the council. The 
only institutions to which the Political Council was accountable were the High Government 
in Batavia and, still farther away, the "Heeren XVII" (the directors of the VOC) in the 
Netherlands.16
Of course, the Political Council firmly controlled that part of the town's population that 
was in the service of the VOC. The number of Company servants in the province of Am­
boina increased steadily from a few hundred at the beginning of the seventeenth century to
14 VCXI1309:848r-849v; Valentijn, Oost-Indien, Beschr., pp. 126-27; Amb. Z., p. 257; Knaap, Kruidnagelen, p. 195.
15 H. T. Colenbrander, ed., Daghregister gehouden int casteel Batavia 1636 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1899), p. 230; Knaap, 
Kruidnagelen, pp. 22, 39, 45-47,152; Knaap, Memories, pp. 250, 273; VOC 1260: res. 30-7-1666; 1437: lOOr-lOlv; 
1453:62r.
16 Valentijn, Oost-Indien, Beschr., pp. T il-IB , 338; Knaap, Kruidnagelen, pp. 269-70.
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almost one thousand at the end of it. About 50 percent of them were concentrated in the 
castle and the town. The largest sectors in the VOC organization were the military and 
naval, but the most powerful was the commerce sector, which decided all matters con­
cerning general policy and trade. Apart from the captain, all officials in the Political Council 
were recruited from this sector. Considering its duties, a more proper label for it would 
have been "civil service." The non-Company servant population of the town, usually called 
burgers, or colonists, were divided into three vertically organized sections: the European, 
Chinese, and indigenous burgerij (citizenry). Although each citizenry possessed leaders of its 
own, their autonomy was very limited. It was the Political Council, which after consultation 
with the most prominent members of the respective citizenries, nominated the leaders. 
These leaders possessed executive powers but lacked any decision-making authority.17
The phenomenon of the European citizenry, or Vrijburgerij (free citizenry), originated in 
about 1610. As soon as the Dutch took over from the Portuguese, a few Company servants 
began regular sexual intercourse with Asian women. As early as 1607, Adm. Comelis 
Matelief allowed Dutch men to officially marry Ambonese and other Asian women. Because 
it was very difficult for a European married to an Asian woman to be repatriated, some 
employees left the service and tried to make a living in town. Moreover, leading Company 
circles in the Netherlands deemed it necessary to stimulate the growth of this category of 
settlers by sending colonists direct from Europe. The motive behind this initiative was that 
in times of danger the colonists could assist the VOC militarily, just as the casados were 
doing in the Portuguese towns. Consequently, in 1611, a contingent of twenty-five European 
families arrived in Ambon to found a colony. This attempt, however, was not very success­
ful because, apart from difficulties in earning a decent living, the morals of the people con­
cerned left much to be desired, at least according to the critical Governor-General Jan 
Pietersz. Coen. It is not surprising, therefore, that after this first attempt at direct Dutch 
immigration to Ambon nothing further is heard about the subject. Consequently, Company 
servants who left the VOC were the only source of new members for this group. Because the 
VOC was not only a secure employer but also an employer that was very often short of 
hands, the growth of the Vrijburger community was not very impressive. Moreover, be­
cause of the shortage of European females, its composition always was liable to 
"mestizofication." Around 1700, the European citizen group, including several mestizos, 
was only seventy males strong.18
The history of the Chinese citizenry started very soon after that of the European Vrij­
burgerij. It dates more or less from the same period as the foundation of Batavia in 1619. The 
immigration of Chinese to Ambon may be seen as an indirect result of the policy of the VOC 
to attract Chinese settlers to the colonial capital. Just before 1620, there was already word of 
an influx of Chinese migrants into Ambon, and around 1630, they numbered one hundred.19
After 1650, the prosperous and well-to-do Chinese community was confronted with a 
less favorable policy from the authorities. In the second half of the 1650s and the first half of 
the 1660s, there were initiatives in government circles to forbid all Chinese involvement in 
the internal and external trade of the province of Amboina and to order them to concentrate
17 Valentijn, Oost-Indien, Beschr., pp. 270,338; Knaap, Kruidnagelen, pp. 279-80.
18 Rumphius, "Ambonsche Historie," pt. 1: 27; H. T. Colenbrander, fan Pietersz. Coen. Bescheiden omtrent zijn 
bedrijf in Indie (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1934), 6: 40 ,42,49; Mooij, Geschiedenis, p. 49; Valentijn, Oost-Indien, Beschr., p. 
270.
19 Colenbrander, Coen, p. 271; Rumphius, "Ambonsche Historie," pt. 1: 83; L. Blusse, Strange Company. Chinese 
settlers. Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia, Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, 
Land- en Volkenkunde 122 (Dordrecht: Foris, 1986), pp. 80-81.
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exclusively on agricultural and handicraft businesses. Those who were not willing to do so 
were faced with the choice of either leaving Ambon or becoming Christian. The reason for 
this rather hostile approach can be found in the VOC's fear that the Chinese, by way of their 
trading networks and credit facilities, would stimulate the smuggling of cloves, a trade that 
was the monopoly of the Company. The anti-Chinese policy also might have resulted from 
pressure from their politically more influential rivals, European citizen traders, or a general 
fear of the Chinese in these years because of the Chinese takeover of the VOC's positions in 
Taiwan in 1662. In time, because the Chinese were considered indispensable for the trade re­
lations of the province, in particular for the import of rice, anti-Chinese sentiment disap­
peared. Now and then, however, anti-Chinese tendencies rose again. Nevertheless, the 
number of Chinese became quite substantial; by 1700 there were some two hundred men, 
the majority of them Buddhists. In the Chinese citizenry, a mestizofication tendency was 
visible as well. Because of the lack of Chinese women, many Chinese had to marry 
Indonesian women, usually former slaves of Makassarese or Balinese origin.20
The indigenous citizenry is sometimes equated with the nineteenth and early twentieth- 
century Ambonese citizenry, that is, a citizenry that consisted of ethnic Ambonese.21 How­
ever, this grouping is a mistake because "indigenous" in Company times was a label used 
for Asians in general. In the seventeenth and most of the eighteenth century, the indigenous 
citizenry consisted of non-Ambonese, "foreign," Asians. In 1605, it included mainly orang 
merdeka, or Mardijkers, as the Dutch used to call them, who had been left behind by the Por­
tuguese. During the entire seventeenth century, this group was reinforced by mestizos 
and/or migrants from other parts of Asia. In 1656, for instance, a considerable number of 
former Makassarese prisoners of war strengthened their ranks. The most regular and sub­
stantial growth, however, was contributed by the influx of freed slaves, usually of Makas­
sarese, Butonese, Buginese, and Balinese origins. Around 1700, Mardijker-labeled men 
numbered some 230, whereas the number of men of South Sulawesi/Balinese origin 
approximated 210. According to their names, about 90 to 100 percent of these people must 
have been Christian. From an ethnological standpoint, the indigenous citizenry could have 
been the largest citizenry. At the end of the seventeenth century, however, this was not the 
case because of administrative reasons.22
As mentioned, each of the three citizenries had its own leadership, nominated by the 
Political Council from its most prominent members. The Chinese were the first to have such 
a leader, called the Chinese captain. In 1619, a Christian Chinese, Herman, became the first 
to hold this position. The first names of European and indigenous captains appear in the 
records of the 1630s. It is possible, however, that the first European and indigenous captains 
were nominated at a much earlier date. The European and indigenous citizenries counted in 
their ranks, besides a captain, a lieutenant, an ensign, and even sergeants and corporals. On 
the contrary, the Chinese had to make do with a captain only. This difference resulted from 
the fact that the European and indigenous citizenry each raised a militia company as a town 
guard. Instead of militia duties, every Chinese man had to pay one, later three-quarters, of a 
rixdollar per month to the VOC. According to the instructions for the citizen's militias, dat­
ing from 1688, every male citizen between the ages of sixteen and sixty years was liable to 
guard duty and had to bring his own weapon for that purpose. Only the captain, the lieu
20 VOC 880:500; 888:599; 889:659; Valentijn, Oost-lndien, Beschr., pp. 259, 268, 270.
2* H. J. de Graaf, De geschiedenis van Ambon en de Zuid-Molukken (Franeker: Wever, 1977), p. 132.
22 Valentijn, Oost-lndien, Bcschr., pp. 269-70; Knaap, Kruidwgelen, p. 279; Knaap, Memories, p. 201.
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tenant, the ensign, and the six sergeants could bear weapons that were paid for by their 
company. Overall, one-third of a company was required to be armed with pikes and two- 
thirds of the company with muskets.23
In 1647, the European militia was 41 strong and the indigenous, 74. In 1656, the numbers 
were 58 and 73, respectively. Twenty years later, in 1676, the relative strength of the Euro­
pean militia had dwindled. Although it had grown to 80 members, the indigenous militia 
had grown much faster, to 202. According to Valentijn, however, around 1700 both militias 
were 250 strong. This last figure is rather surprising because the number of ethnic European 
and mestizo men did not even total 100.24 What had happened? Because of demographic 
trends, the rather influential and well-to-do European citizen officers tended to become a 
class of "generals without soldiers," whereas their counterparts, the indigenous officers, be­
cause of the fast-expanding group of relatively poor followers, were almost drowning in 
soldiers. The Political Council, therefore, decided during the late 1680s to enlarge the Euro­
pean citizenry with a number of people from the poorer sections of the indigenous citizenry. 
So, in the end, the European citizenry was not "white-washed" but "painted black." This 
change must be interpreted as a token of the privileged position of the elite of the European 
Vrijburger class in matters of political concern. Another sign of this was the feet that all the 
wijkmeesters nominated from the 1660s onward were leading Dutch citizens. Of course, the 
European citizens owed this favored position to the fact that ethnically and culturally they 
were close to the decision-making Political Council.25
In the province of Amboina, justice was administered according to the legal status of the 
subjects. Thus, there was a Raad van Justitie (Council of Justice), that presided over affairs 
concerning Company servants, a Landraad for cases in which the Ambonese villagers were 
involved, and a Schepenbank (Bench of Aldermen), that served the interests of the citizens. 
Only the Council of Justice and the Bench of Aldermen will be dealt with here. The Council 
of Justice originated from the first decades of VOC rule, and its members were largely the 
same as those of the Political Council. The Bench of Aldermen was installed in 1628 and had 
as members four Company servants, four Ambonese village chiefs, and four prominent citi­
zens. In 1663, however, the Bench of Aldermen was dissolved and henceforth the affairs of 
the citizens were dealt with by the Council of Justice, which for these special cases was tem­
porarily enlarged to include one or two prominent citizens. Because of this dual role as well 
as the ongoing growth of the urban population, the number of cases brought before the 
Council of Justice greatly increased. To lighten the load of its members, a special Council of 
Small Affairs that dealt with minor civil cases, was established around 1666. The composi­
tion of this council closely resembled that of the previous Bench of Aldermen.26
Although the role of the leading citizens in the government of the town did not show 
any substantial expansion, no serious opposition against the rule of the Political Council 
ever emerged from the ranks of the citizenries. Apart from the fact that the VOC employed 
approximately 40 percent of the male nonslave town population and that it could count on a 
strong military position in the castle vis-a-vis the town, the vertical division of the popula­
tion along the lines of separate citizenries was probably responsible for the absence of oppo­
23 Valentijn, Oost-Indien, Beschr. pp. 268, 341; P. A. Tiele, ed., liouwsloffen voor de geschiedenis der Nederlanders in 
den Maleischen archipel, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1886), 1: 253; Rumphius, "Ambonsche Histone," pt. 1: p. 132; VOC 
1453:48v.
24 Knaap, Memories, pp. 176, 201; Valentijn, Oost-Indien, Beschr., p. 347; VOC 1317:359v.
25 VOC 1309:849v res.; 7953,1436,1451,1461,1481: zielsbeschr.
26 Knaap, Memories, pp. 94, 211, 422; Valentijn, Oost-Indien, Beschr., pp. 339-40; Knaap, Kruidnagelen, p. 39.
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sition. A coalition of all three citizenries was very unlikely. In particular, the European and 
the Chinese citizenries were at times in fierce economic competition. The leaders of the 
European citizens must have been aware that although the VOC limited their freedom, 
without the protection of the VOC they would have been lost. The most ardent opponents of 
the Political Council in Kota Ambon were, therefore, found in quite another comer of soci­
ety, notably in the ranks of the Company itself, the Calvinist ministers.
As in the Netherlands, the affairs of the local Protestant church were taken care of by a 
Kerkeraad (Church Council), which in Ambon was founded in 1625. Besides the ministers 
themselves, this council usually consisted of a few laymen, such as one Company servant, at 
least one European citizen, and two Ambonese village chiefs. The ministers, varying in 
number from two to five, always dominated the scene. Throughout the entire seventeenth 
century, as in other VOC settlements, there appeared to be a tradition of conflict between 
the ministers and the Political Council. These conflicts were partly personal and partly a 
matter of principle. The background of the conflicts based on principle can be found in the 
theocratic tendencies within the seventeenth-century Calvinist church in the Netherlands. In 
the opinion of many a church minister, the church should not be subject to the intervention 
of political authorities. The ministers who went to Asia, however, were on the Company's 
payroll, and as such, they were Company servants who had to obey the orders of the Politi­
cal Council. So one should not be surprised that clashes took place at regular intervals be­
tween ministers and governors and that the authorities responded to this by curbing the 
autonomy of the Church Council as much as possible. The first step in this process was the 
introduction of a delegate in the meetings of the Church Council, whose duty it was to re­
port on the proceedings of the Church Council to the Political Council. After fierce opposi­
tion, the ministers were forced to accept this intrusion in 1631.27
The next step that took away part of the ministers' authority took place around 1660. 
Before that time, every Christian who wished to marry had to ask advice and permission 
from a minister. This task was then given to a special Council for Marriage Affairs, which 
shortly afterward merged with the Council for Small Affairs. The VOC, the European citi­
zenry, and the Ambonese village chiefs had their own representatives in this new council. 
Ministers, however, were excluded. At the beginning of the century, the Church Council 
also administered the income and expenditure of the poor. In 1690, however, a special Board 
of Deacons was created to which no ministers were nominated. Thus by the end of the sev­
enteenth century, the powerbase of the ministers had become very narrow.28
The existence of institutions to take care of the poor suggests another aspect of urban life 
that should not be overlooked. Given the migrant nature of Kota Ambon society, the author­
ities were more or less obliged to provide for the care of orphans and inheritances. As far as 
the Christian majority was concerned, these matters were treated by the Board of Trustees, 
already existing in the 1630s and consisting of two Company servants and three citizens, as 
well as the VOC itself and/or the previously mentioned judicial organizations. All matters 
concerning the inheritance of non-Christians, mainly Chinese, were dealt with by the 
Council of Executors of Chinese Estates, founded in 1647. This council was presided over by 
the administrator of the Company's cloth shop and had as members the captain of the 
indigenous citizenry, the captain of the Chinese citizenry, and other prominent Chinese.29
27 Mooij, Geschiedenis, pp. 206, 208, 218.
28 VOC 1497:64r-66v; Knaap, Memories, pp. 94,176.
29 Valentijn, Oost-lndien, Beschr., p. 340; Knaap, Memories, pp. 94,176.
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Economic Structure
Did Kota Ambon dominate its surrounding countryside? From a political point of view, 
it certainly did. The government of the province of Amboina resided in town. But did it 
dominate the countryside economically as well? Again this question can be answered affir­
matively. The city was the channel through which all imports and exports took place, at 
least after the VOC had subdued the final resistance of the Ambonese against its rule in the 
1650s. All important decisions concerning Ambon's only substantial export item, cloves, 
were taken by the VOC, which had already established a trade monopoly in this product in 
the 1640s. The domination, however, was a VOC affair; the citizen community did not take 
part in it to any substantial degree. The VOC had forbidden the citizens to cultivate or to 
trade in cloves. Thus, the only opportunities the citizens had to participate in the internal 
economy of the province were in retail trade, mainly of imported items such as textiles and 
Chinese earthenware. Their chances in this field were still limited because the Ambonese 
economy was very subsistence oriented. There proved to be little scope for penetration into 
this rather closed economy. The citizens did not participate much in the external trade rela­
tions of Ambon either, for the Company's ships carried the entire clove export. The citizens' 
outward-bound trading vessels left Ambon almost empty, which meant that the profits on 
foreign trade had to be made on the homeward-bound voyage. Moreover, the VOC, always 
afraid that somebody might threaten its clove monopoly, set limitations on the routes and 
destinations of private shipping.30
An examination of the city's internal economic structure reveals, that in 1694 more than 
40 percent of the total adult male population, 540 out of approximately 1250, was in the ser­
vice of the VOC, a very substantial number indeed. Numbering 318, the military sector was 
the strongest inside VOC ranks, whereas the naval, the craftsmen, and the commerce sectors 
had 83, 60, and 45 members respectively. Kota Ambon was not only a center of government 
but also a garrison town. Many a Company servant, in particular those in the military 
group, had to live on a small salary, which was paid only occasionally. The larger part of the 
salary was kept by the Company, to be paid only when the employee left the service. Excep­
tions to this rule were possible, for instance, when a person married in Asia and had to 
spend the salary on the upkeep of his household. In the entire province of Amboina in 1694, 
the total annual sum of salaries for all Company servants should have been some f 200,000. 
Only f 120,000,60 percent, was actually paid; the rest remained on Company books.31
To give some examples of payments to Company servants: a soldier had a monthly 
salary of f 9, a sergeant and an assistent (clerk) f 20, a minister almost f 100, and the governor 
f 200. In addition, every employee received kostgeld (boarding money): the soldier f 4 per 
month, the sergeant and the clerk almost f 10, and the minister approximately f 30. The gov­
ernor received almost f 75 plus an extra sum of f 60 to cover the cost of entertaining his offi­
cial guests. The servants could also count on provisions from the Company's stores. The 
lower ranks had to make do with one man's ration of rice. The higher a person's rank, how­
ever, the more he received. The governor, for instance, could count on considerable deliver­
ies of beer, butter, vinegar, Persian wine, and so forth. His annual rice ration amounted to 
3,000 kg, whereas his ration of European wines was 7001.32
30 Knaap, Kruidnagelen, pp. 22-23,218-22.
31 VOC 1551: zielsbeschr.; 1573:508r-519v.
32 Valentijn, Oost-Indien, Beschr., p. 284; F. W. Stapel, ed., Pieter van Dam: Beschrijvinge van de Oost-Indische Com- 
pagnie, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publication 87 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1943), 3: 230, 265-66, 286; C. R. Boxer, The 
Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800 (London: Hutchinson, 1977), pp. 300-1.
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The highest officials, such as the governor, the senior merchant, and the captain, be­
longed to the richest class in town. Besides the above-mentioned income, the governor had 
exclusive rights to fisheries at particular places in the Bay of Ambon and to the overwichten, 
that is, the extra weight that occurred on cloves exported to Batavia. This extra weight was 
the result of the cloves becoming more hydrated in the period between their delivery by the 
villagers and the shipment from Ambon. The average value of the extra weight amounted to 
f 4,000 to f 5,000 annually. Moreover, the governor received a small percentage of the Com­
pany's turnover of rice and Indian textiles. The senior merchant also had extra income from 
the clove trade. He and his assistants were supposed to charge the Ambonese villagers 0.5 lb 
of tare on the delivery of each bag of cloves. Because the bags were never as heavy as 0.5 lb, 
the senior merchant could expropriate the difference between the total theoretical and the 
total real delivery of cloves. The senior merchant was also involved in buying arak from the 
crews of incoming Company vessels, which he then sold to urban dwellers. The sale of arak 
seems to have been a most important business for the captain as well. He appeared to be one 
of the principal suppliers of the garrison. The governor, senior merchant, and captain were 
also moneylenders to Ambonese clove cultivators, private VOC employees, and citizens, as 
well as to the VOC itself. They could always also earn something from bribery to promote 
lower-ranking employees and in lawsuits. Finally, there was the possibility of squeezing the 
Ambonese by not turning over the whole payment for the delivery of cloves or by having 
them work as compulsory laborers a few days extra for the governor's or any other high 
official's private purpose.33
These practices were partly legal, partly illegal. The line between the two was not always 
easy to draw. Occasionally, the High Government in Batavia tried to cope with the most 
serious abuses by investigating the conduct of a particular person, such as Governor Jacob 
Cops in 1672. He was accused of having used slaves, craftsmen, compulsory laborers, and 
building materials from the Company to build at least twenty-four houses for himself. He 
also appeared to be an "invisible" partner in the farming-out of the arak monopoly and of 
the monopoly for sago extraction in the Company's forests. In addition, he also partly 
owned four citizens' vessels. When all this came to light, Cops replied that he had lawfully 
paid for everything needed for the building of his houses, but, alas, had forgotten exactly 
how much. As regards his participation in all kinds of farm contracts and in private ships, 
he stated that this was not deemed explicitly illegal and pointed to the behavior of Comelis 
Speelman, the conqueror of Makassar.34 Cops was recalled to Batavia, which, of course, does 
not mean that his successors did not act in the same way. It is likely that they were not as 
extensively involved as Cops and/or more successfully concealed their dealings from 
Batavia.
The "official" economic activities of the VOC, reveal a large turnover of cloves that were 
collected from the villagers in the province under monopoly stipulations and exported to 
Batavia by way of Kota Ambon. This activity—apart from the mentioned occasional legal 
and illegal opportunities for individual Company employees—did not, however, render 
much income to the VOC branch of Amboina. At the end of each financial year, the entry of 
cloves vanished from the books: within the span of one year, the entire harvest was collected 
and turned over to Batavia, physically as well as administratively. The VOC Amboina 
branch had to earn surpluses on less important trades, which amounted to only a fraction of 
its total expenditure. In 1694-1695 for instance, the VOC government at Victoria spent
33 Valentijn, Oost-lndien, Bcschr., pp. 275,278,287-88, 299-300; Knaap, Kruidnagelen, pp. 243-45.
34 VOC 1286:572v-578r; 1297: 482v-486r.
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f 193,000 against a credit balance of f 70,000. This figure of f 70,000 was realized in two ways: 
commercially and fiscally. Commercially, every now and again the VOC sold rice and man­
ufactured articles, such as nails, sails, and so forth, to private persons. By far the most prof­
itable trade item, which rendered some f 28,000 annually, was the sale of Indian textiles in 
the Company's cloth shop in front of the castle. Just over one-half of the returns were real­
ized fiscally. Here one notices a subdivision between income earned directly through the 
VOC servants themselves and indirectly through tax farmers.35
The directly realized income from fiscal sources came from such things as small fees for 
endorsing legal documents and issuing safe-conducts for private shipping, the collection of 
import and export duties, licenses for building a house or making a seru (semi-permanent 
construction for fishing) in Kota Ambon's roadstead, and collecting a tax from the peddlers 
who used the marketplace.36 The indirectly realized income was generally derived from 
farming out taxes. This phenomenon was mainly connected to the urban economy and 
dated back from about 1620. After a few alterations, this institution reached its ultimate 
shape in the second half of the century. Around 1694, the total sum of tax farming amounted 
to approximately f 34,000 annually. By far the most important form of tax farming was that 
of arak and sageru, which rendered f 24,000. Sageru was the locally produced palmwine, the 
sale of which was liable to a small duty. Arak was a spirit distilled from sageru and was 
very popular among the urban populace. The tax farmer and his partners had the exclusive 
right to bum and deliver arak to private persons and pubs. He also had the right to tax im­
ported arak. This quite important business was usually in the hands of a Chinese, but the 
control over it was often challenged by the leaders of the European citizenry. To this end, 
they appealed to the VOC government. Their attempts, however, met only with temporary 
success as in the end the Chinese always won the day 37
In the private sector of the urban economy, as in almost every preindustrial city, a large 
segment of the population still was agriculturally oriented. In all sections of the citizenry 
one encounters agricultural occupations, but the Chinese and Makassarese, in particular, 
specialized in growing food crops, albeit on a small scale. Rich European citizens owned 
some cows to produce milk and butter for the market. In the European-mestizo and the 
Mardijker-Makassarese communities, one also comes across some hunters, fishermen, palm 
wine tappers, and, finally, firewood cutters. In all ethnic groups, Chinese, European-mestizo 
as well as Mardijker-Makassarese, one notices persons, who with the assistance of slaves, 
were working as carpenters, blacksmiths, masons, tailors, or shoemakers. Then some 
people, in particular in the European-mestizo group, ran pubs. In 1662, there were thirty 
such publicans or inn keepers. Moreover, there were people, men as well as women, prob­
ably mainly from the Chinese and the Mardijker-Makassarese group, who were regular 
market traders. In 1675, they numbered approximately ninety. The Chinese were the shop­
keepers for the Ambonese and traveled around the countryside. Most of these small traders 
got their merchandise from bigger merchants who were usually Chinese as well. At the end 
of the seventeenth century, there were approximately ten such bigger traders. They domi­
nated the distribution of Indian textiles from the Company's cloth shop to the consumers. In
35 VOC 1573:508r-519v; Knaap, Kruidnagelen, pp. 220-21,223-24.
36 Knaap, Kruidnagelen, pp. 177,211-12,216,218, 221.
37 VOC 1535: 28v, 104v; 1556: 71v; W. Ph. Coolhaas, ed., Jan Pietersz Coen. Bescheiden omtrent zijn bedrijf in Indie 
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1953), 7b:969-70;Valentijn, Oost-Indien, Bcschr., pp. 258,341; Knaap, Kruidnagelen,pp. 187-
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this respect, the leading European citizens once again complained bitterly about this domi­
nation, but to no avail.38
The bigger Chinese merchants were powerful businessmen, as were the distillers of 
arak, who usually employed at least twelve slaves to keep this business going. It is difficult 
to estimate the number of these distilleries. Evidence from the 1670s suggests that the num­
ber varied between two and seven and that the Chinese dominated this trade. The Chinese 
and a few European citizens also excelled in sawmilling; every mill usually employed some 
fifteen to twenty slaves. How many businessmen were engaged in this profession is not 
known. Another business that flourished, particularly at the end of the seventeenth century 
because of the Company's building activities was the production of tiles and bricks. An 
average tile- and brickworks operated with approximately twenty slaves and three to four 
buffaloes and earned some f 3,000 to f 4,000 annually. Chinese owned six or seven of these 
works and European citizens three to four.39
As stated, Kota Ambon was the province's external harbor. It also was as a center for 
local trade, but I do not have figures about the extent of this phenomenon. The trade was in 
locally produced foodstuffs, mainly sago and fish products, against textiles, small iron tools, 
pottery, and salt. For external trade, it is noteworthy that in the last half of the seventeenth 
century ten to fifteen VOC ships and thirty to fifty privately owned vessels called annually. 
The Company ships served as communication links with Batavia and the neighboring 
provinces of Temate, Banda, and Makassar and were mainly used for carrying troops, 
ammunition, and all kinds of equipment. They also carried imported Indian textiles, Java­
nese rice, and European hard currency. The currency paid for the only important export 
cargo, cloves, of which approximately 600,000 lbs were shipped annually. The privately 
owned vessels must have departed with almost empty holds as there was, apart from the 
VOC cloves monopoly, no export item of any value. They returned with loads of Sulawesi- 
produced textiles, rice from Java and Makassar, Chinese and Tonkinese pottery that was 
taken in at Batavia, and, finally, Balinese, Makassarese, Buginese, and Butonnese slaves 
bought in Batavia or Makassar. The import of slaves, however, was gradually limited by the 
government because it feared those of certain origin, principally Balinese and Makassarese, 
which were deemed to be "dangerous." Whether this limitative policy had any real effect is 
hard to say, however.40
The bigger ships of the VOC that called at Kota Ambon's roadstead did not have this 
town as their homeport. The Amboina branch of the VOC possessed only a few smaller ves­
sels for local transport and/or patrol duties. In 1694, they numbered three. One can only 
guess at the number of privately owned ships that were used for internal trade or journeys 
to neighboring provinces on the basis of information from the 1680s. The number probably 
must have been twenty-three, all of which could carry no more than 30 last (one last equaled 
2,000 kg). The number of vessels with a capacity of over 30 last sailing to Makassar or dis­
tant Java and Batavia has been calculated at twenty-two— one more than in the year 1679- 
1680. In that year, seven out of twenty-one vessels belonged to Europeans, ten to Chinese, 
and four to members of the indigenous citizenry. Again, the Chinese played a more impor­
tant role than other groups. These larger ships were, according to Valentijn, usually manned 
by approximately fifteen sailors each, which means that the number of sailors in Kota Am­
38 VOC 1240: 728; Valentijn, Oost-Indien, Beschr., pp. 257-58, 269, 349-50; Knaap, Kruidnagelen, pp. 211,224.
39 VOC 1271: 32r; 1309: 824v res.; 1334: 74r res.; Valentijn, Oost-Indien, Beschr., p. 257; Knaap, Memories, pp. 251, 
281.
40 Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 134-35,212,219-22.
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bon must have been at least three hundred. Many of them were recruited from the poorer 
segments of the indigenous citizenry at f 9 per month.41
Demography
According to population figures, Kota Ambon witnessed a steady growth throughout 
the seventeenth century. When the Dutch took over from the Portuguese in 1605, the popu­
lation could be counted by the hundred. Just after 1610, there were already more than 1,500 
inhabitants. In 1673, the population was 4,089 and in 1694, 5,487. In 1673, the strength of the 
group of VOC servants and their families, the European, the Chinese, and the indigenous 
citizenry was 1,198, 748, 967, and 1,176, respectively. In 1694, these numbers were 1,500, 
1,868,1,109, and 1,010. The turnover of many Asians from the indigenous to the European 
citizenry at the end of the 1680s has already been discussed.42
From approximately 1670 onward, the VOC held annual censuses for the entire province 
of Amboina. Those from the years 1671 to 1695 have been preserved and have been ana­
lyzed critically elsewhere, as far as the Ambonese rural population is concerned.43 On the 
basis of these censuses, zielsbeschrijvingen (descriptions of souls), it is also possible to analyze 
the composition of the urban population. One of the most striking facts derived from this 
analysis is that the number of slaves always exceeded one-half of the total population, usu­
ally between 50 and 60 percent. For the adult population (because children were not listed 
according to sex), the unbalanced sex-ratio is striking: only 40 percent were women—the re­
sult of the high proportion of unmarried Company employees and the unequal sex-ratio 
among slaves, which will be discussed later.44
On the basis of the censuses one can also estimate the ethnic composition of the urban 
population. For the nonslave population, almost 50 percent was of Southeast Asian, mainly 
Malay-Indonesian origin (Ambonese, Mardijker, Makassarese, etc.), followed by 25 percent 
of European and 15 percent of Chinese origin. Southeast Asians were found in the indige­
nous and/or European citizenry; the majority of the European and Chinese inhabitants were 
in the VOC group and the Chinese citizenry, respectively. When one takes the slave popula­
tion into account, a more complete picture of the situation arises. Because over 90 percent of 
the slaves had a Southeast Asian ethnic background, it is not astonishing to find that 75 per­
cent of the total population was of Southeast Asian origin. Less than 5 percent of the South­
east Asians were of Ambonese origin, which leads to the conclusion that Kota Ambon was 
clearly a Southeast Asian migrant city. By "immigrants" are meant non-Ambonese who had 
been resident in the town for one, two, or sometimes even three generations. Compared to 
the 70 percent Southeast Asian immigrant majority, the European and Chinese segments 
were only small minorities.45
The census of 1694 has been analyzed in detail to obtain extra information about demo­
graphic patterns and behavior.46 This analysis, however, focuses on what will be called the 
"settled" population. "Settled" is defined here as "having or living in a household and/or 
family structure."
41 VOC 914:1390-1; 1356: Dagregister Victoria; 1551: zielsbcschr.; Valentijn, Oost-lndien, Beschr., p. 348).
42 Knaap, Memories, p. 11; VOC 1293: zielsbeschr.; 1551: zielsbeschr.
43 Knaap, Kruidnagelen, pp. 99-137,279-82.
44 VOC 1293,1385,1551: zielsbeschr.
45 Ibid.
46 VOC 1551: zielsbeschr.
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Not settled 558 — — — 558
Settlement uncertain 65 38 21 42 166
Settled population 877 1,830 1,088 968 4,763
Total population 1,500 1,868 1,109 1,010 5,487
The 558 nonsettled persons are found entirely in the VOC group. It consists of 409 VOC ser­
vants and 149 other persons. The category of "other persons" contains, for instance, the 23 
poor living at the expense of the Board of Deacons and the 101 persons in jail. The non­
settled VOC servants group includes all anonymous employees, who were only referred to 
in total numbers; 75 were ordinary sailors, and 234 were common soldiers. These anony­
mous employees must have lived in the barracks inside Victoria castle. The settled and set­
tlement uncertain categories contain persons whose names are individually written in the 
census. The difference between certain and uncertain settlement has been taken to be 
whether the person in question possesses a male or female partner and/or children or 
slaves, or, is listed without any partner, child, or slave. When this criterion is applied, the 
conclusion can be drawn that many male persons have to be considered as uncertain set­
tlers. An exception in the application of this criterion is made, however, for the few individ­
ually listed female persons without relatives or slaves. Usually these were labeled as 
"widow" or "free woman," which can be interpreted as an indication that these women had 
separate households that justified their inclusion in the category of definite settlers.
According to this criterion, it is easy to establish that only 12.5 to 24.5 percent of a total 
542 Company servants residing in town were living in a household and/or family structure. 
Of Company personnel living in the outposts of the Amboina province, 18 percent, more or 
less the same proportion, were accustomed to family life. Of the settled Company servants 
living in town, it is not surprising to see that 78 percent were bom in Europe. For the small 
section of settled ethnic European citizens, this percentage was even higher: 86 percent. 
Thirty-one percent of the Company servants and 42 percent of the European citizens origi­
nated from Europe outside the Netherlands.
Fifty and 77 percent, respectively, of the male Mardijkers in the European and indige­
nous citizenries were bom in the Amboina province. This leads to the conclusion that the 
class of Mardijkers, ethnically non-Ambonese, in the second part of the seventeenth century, 
must probably be considered as a group of second- or third-generation freed slaves. In con­
trast, the group of Makassarese and related peoples, by which all Sulawesi and Nusa Teng- 
gara ethnicities are meant, was usually not Ambonia born. Consequently, this category 
should be labeled as comprising mostly first-generation freed slaves. The southern part of 
the island of Sulawesi, including Buton, appeared to be the birthplace for 60 and 52 percent 
of these people in the European and indigenous citizenries, respectively. In both citizenries, 
39 and 36 percent of the Makassarese and related peoples were bom in Nusa Tenggara, 
which means that their ethnicity usually must have been Balinese, Timorese, or Bimanese. 
Unfortunately, in all cases of Chinese males in the Chinese citizenry the place of birth is not
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given. One can only guess that they must have been bom either in China or in another area 
of Southeast Asia where migrant Chinese were living.
It is also possible to say something about the place of birth of female heads of house­
holds because when a household did not have a male head the name and place of birth of 
the female head was listed instead. Most of these women were widows. Fifty-five percent of 
the European citizenry originated from Sulawesi and Nusa Tenggara; for the Chinese and 
indigenous citizenries these numbers amounted to 54 and 56 percent, respectively, which 
indicates that the recruitment of marriage partners for male citizens was to a large extent 
freeing their favorite slave women.









Number of households 89 257 130 197 673
With male head 68 193 91 149 501
With female head 21 64 39 48 172
Average number of members 9.85 7.12 8.37 4.91 7.08
Average number of children 1.03 0.91 1.25 0.88 0.99
Average number of slaves 6.55 4.34 5.53 2.29 4.26
Most striking is the relative smallness of the average household in the indigenous citi­
zenry, which resulted from the fact that such a household was not able to compete with 
households in the other groups as far as slave ownership was concerned. In the indigenous 
citizenry, the average number of slaves did not even exceed 50 percent of its total member­
ship. In all groups, there is the same low number of children. Obviously, this migrant city 
could not have been able to maintain its numbers by natural reproduction.
Table 3. Proportionate (percentage) Distribution of 






Makassarese, etc. 29.54 49.42
Ambonese 2.00 2.33
Total 100 100
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The percentages for the males are not surprising in view of what was said previously. 
Suffice to say, that the European males could be found first in the VOC group and second in 
the European citizenry; the mestizos mostly in the European citizenry; and the Chinese 
mostly in the Chinese citizenry. The Mardijkers appeared first in the indigenous citizenry 
and second in the European citizenry. In the Makassarese and related peoples group, it was 
the other way around: they were most concentrated in the European citizenry and after that 
in the indigenous citizenry. Among the female heads of households, the number of the 
Makassarese group (i.e., the relatively recently freed slaves) was relatively large. Special 
notice should be taken of the female heads of households in the Chinese citizenry. More 
than one-half of them appeared to be of Makassarese group origin and less than one-half 
were pure Chinese. This should be a warning when one interprets the marriage pattern of 
the male Chinese citizenry where it seems that most of the wives of the Chinese were of 
pure Chinese origin. Quite a large number of these women, however, must have been 
former slaves, that is, South Sulawesi or Balinese women.47












Not married 13.10 35.48 20.41 12.50 4.73
European wife 29.76 — — —
Mestizo wife 25.00 32.26 — 0.78 —
Chinese wife 1.19 3.23 66.33 0.78 —
Mardijker wife 17.86 19.35 4.08 73.44 17.57
Makassarese wife 7.14 6.45 — 2.34 —
Ambonese wife 5.95 6.45 — 2.34 —
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Obviously, it was almost impossible for a non-European to marry a European wife. 
European men preferred to marry European women, although mestizo partners were popu­
lar as well. Mestizo men were in a difficult situation because many mestizo women married 
Europeans. Apparently, a quite large proportion of them preferred not to (re)marry rather 
than to choose a partner from the Southeast Asian ethnic groups. As noted previously, the 
percentage of Chinese married to Chinese women is too high in this table; quite a lot of 
these so-called Chinese women were of the Makassarese group. Finally, the Mardijker and 
Makassarese preferred marrying women from their own ethnicity. They must have had no 
other choice.
47 Valentijn, Oost-lndiSn, Beschr., p. 259.
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European-European 25 0.92 20.64
European-mestizo 21 1.33 5.86
European-Mardijker 15 1.40 2.93
Mestizo-mestizo 10 2.90 23.80
Chinese-"Chinese" 65 1.55 6.95
Mardijker-Mardijker 94 1.26 1.26
Makassarese-Makassarese 115 0.80 2.25
As concerns the number of children, the small group of mestizo-mestizo unions with an 
average of 2.9 children did quite well. The lowest number of children was realized by the 
relatively large group of Makassarese-Makassarese: only 0.8 child per union. This fact is not 
difficult to explain because it is more or less in line with the situation in the slave population 
from which this first generation of freedmen originated. Because these couples must have 
been fairly old when manumitted, it is very likely that they would have been unable to have 
a large number of children. In unions with European men, the average number of children 
increased according to the degree of "Asianness" of their wives. In relation to the number of 
slaves they held an opposite trend can be seen, however: the more Asian the wife, the fewer 
slaves they possessed. The high average of slaves in the European-European union, usually 
the top-ranking VOC employees and their spouses, is, nevertheless, exceeded by that of the 
mestizo-mestizo union. However, the well-to-do mestizo lineages dealt with here were 
already long established in Indonesia and were usually found in leading citizen circles.
As stated, the slaves were the largest group in Kota Ambon. In 1694, they numbered 
2,870, 52.3 percent of the total population. These slaves were almost entirely recruited from 
Southeast Asian ethnicities, although one may assume that in the first half of the century, 
when the VOC was not yet fully established in the Southeast Asian slave-trading networks, 
the number of Indian slaves must still have been quite high. Scarcely any of the Southeast 
Asian slaves were from Ambon itself. Most of them originated from South Sulawesi and 
Nusa Tenggara. The Makassarese-Buginese and Balinese ethnicities proved the most popu­
lar with slave owners because of their economic skills.48
The occupations of the slaves were varied. Slaves tilled the land and slaves fished. Slaves 
served their masters in their homes: they cleaned the house, cooked the meals, went to the 
market, carried firewood home, and accompanied their masters or mistresses when they 
went out. Slaves also were skilled craftsmen. Some of them worked in the arak distilleries, 
tile and brickworks, or sawmills, whereas others, particularly those owned by the VOC elite, 
were hired by the VOC when it was short of hands. The most trusted slaves were sent by 
their masters as traders on local sailing voyages. Finally, Makassarese and Balinese women 
were often used as concubines, particularly by the Chinese. Sometimes these liaisons were 
sanctioned when a concubine was promoted to official wife of the master by marriage. The
48 Knaap, Kruidnagelen, pp. 128-33.
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last few examples of the use of slaves suggest that relations between masters and slaves 
were quite good. Quite often, however, relations were strained. Throughout the century one 
finds many references to fugitive slaves, who sometimes became dangerous, robbing travel­
ers in remote parts of the islands. That relations were strained is also apparent from the 
slave legislation of the VOC. On the one hand, the government tried to prevent excesses in 
the treatment of slaves by their owners, but on the other hand, it was draconian in its mea­
sures against fugitives and/or slaves who physically opposed their masters.49
Although 52.3 percent of the total population of the town were slaves, when one ex­
cludes the nonsettled and uncertain settled free population, the proportion of slaves 
appeared to be 60.3 percent. They were more or less equally distributed over the four cate­
gories of population with the exception of the indigenous citizenry, which, with only 46.7 
percent slaves, can be considered the poorest group. From the 2,870 slaves, 51.6 percent 
were adult males; 33.5, adult females; and 14.9, children. The proportion of adult males to 
adult females was 1:0.65, whereas that of adult females to children was 1:0.45. From these 
figures, one may assume that slave owners highly preferred male slaves, probably because 
they were supposed to be more useful for heavy, productive work. The small number of 
children makes it clear that it was continually necessary to import slaves to keep their num­
ber at a satisfactory level. The policy of the VOC to prohibit the import of unreliable slaves 
from Bali and South Sulawesi in 1666, 1683, and 1688, respectively must, therefore, have 
been a considerable threat to the economy of the urban population. Population statistics of a 
later date, such as those of 1694 or 1708, still show such high numbers of slaves that it seems 
very unlikely that these prohibitions were effectively enforced.50











Number of slaves 583 1,116 719 452 2,870
Number of households 89 257 130 197 673
Households without slaves 
(Percentage) 24.72 40.08 25.38 41.62 35.66
Households with 1 or 2 slaves 
(Percentage) 22.47 29.18 26.92 32.99 28.97
Households with 3 to 10 slaves 
(Percentage) 33.71 22.18 31.54 21.32 25.26
Households with 11 or more slaves 
(Percentage) 19.10 8.56 16.15 4.06 10.10
Again the data illustrate that the indigenous citizenry was the poorest category among 
the settled population. The European citizenry was the next poorest, as evidenced by 40 
percent of households without slaves. Most of these, however, were found among its 
Makassarese and Mardijker sections, notably the sections that had ethnically much in com­
49 Knaap, Kruidnagelen, pp. 133-36.
50 Valentijn, Oost-lndien, Beschr., pp. 342,344; Knaap, Kruidnagelen, p. 135.
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mon with the indigenous citizenry. The Chinese citizenry was almost as rich as the VOC 
group, which reflects that the Chinese dominated the private economic sector in trade and 
craftsmanship. The settled VOC employees, the group that dominated the administration 
and the economic affairs of the VOC, however, was the richest.
For this presentation I intended to list the largest slave owners in the 1694 census as 
those who possessed at least 41 slaves, but the indigenous and Chinese citizenries did not 
include anyone who had that many slaves. In the indigenous citizenry the most wealthy 
slave owner was the captain, Jan Tsjong, with 31 slaves. He was a Christian Ambon-bom 
Chinese, which draws attention to the fact that the leadership of this citizenry gradually 
came from people of Christian Chinese and mestizo origin. The most wealthy slave-owning 
member of the Chinese citizenry was, again, the captain, Limkitko, with 37 slaves. In the 
VOC group, two persons owned more than 40 slaves: first, the governor, Nicolaas Schaghen, 
from the small Dutch town of Wijk bij Duurstede, with the exceptional number of 92 slaves; 
and second, a representative of the Ambon-bom mestizo class, Pieter Nuyts, who had risen 
to the mediocre rank of bookkeeper, with 49 slaves. The European citizenry counted five 
persons with more than 40 slaves, among them the captain who, with 177 slaves, was by far 
the richest slave owner in the province of Amboina. His name was Jochem Engel, and he 
was born in German Danzig, now Polish Gdansk, as was the former captain, Hans Groo, 
with 46 slaves. Furthermore, there was Adriaan Kakelaar with 44, born in Veere, a small 
town in Zeeland, one of the maritime provinces of the Dutch republic. These three were all 
former Company employees. There were also two rich, slave-owning representatives of the 
local mestizo class, both bom in the nearby province of Banda but with very Dutch-sound­
ing names. They were Jan de Ruyter and Frans Colijn, who owned 64 and 41 slaves, respec­
tively.
Conclusion
The city of Ambon was founded by the Portuguese just after the erection of their fortress 
on the shores of the Bay of Ambon in 1576. It had no indigenous predecessor. As such, it is 
necessary to modify the image that in Southeast Asia "Manila and Batavia were the only 
urban settlements which were literally started from scratch by Europeans during the six­
teenth and seventeenth centuries."51 If one tries to see beyond the capital cities of the colo­
nial empires, one has to conclude that Kota Ambon and, on the periphery of Southeast Asia, 
Zeelandia on Taiwan, were also created from scratch.52 We should not rule out the possibil­
ity that further research into other areas will produce more examples of this phenomenon.
On the basis of the analyses, particularly demographic, it is possible to define Kota Am­
bon as a Southeast Asian migrant city in which the male element was disproportionately 
large and the number of children relatively small. Consequently, the only way for the city to 
keep its numbers growing, or at least stable, was to attract new migrants. To a considerable 
extent, this migration was forced; for example, Company servants were simply sent on duty, 
or slaves were treated as commodities by traders. The slave population was by far the most 
numerous class in the town. Indigenous Ambonese, however, were absent in the urban 
population. In this period the Ambonese were still a rural phenomenon.
Political power in town was in the hands of the Dutch minority, in particular the elite of 
VOC servants. The institutions that governed the town were mainly of Dutch origin but
51 Blusse, Strange Company, p. 78.
52 J. L. Oosterhoff, "Zeelandia, A Dutch Colonial city on Formosa (1624-1662)," in Colonial Cities. Essays on Urban­
ism in a Colonial Context, ed., R. J. Ross and G. J. Telkamp (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1985), p. 51.
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only in so far as these did not threaten VOC rule. Consequently, one does not come across 
typical Dutch institutions like a vroedschap (a town council of city representatives) and may­
ors, recruited from the ranks of the urban bourgeois elite. Instead, the governor and his 
Political Council held the reins of city government. To cope with typical non-Dutch situa­
tions, however, the VOC had partly adapted the city government to local circumstances by, 
for example, organizing all significant ethnicities in their own citizenries and providing 
them with their own leadership. This practice was copied from precolonial Southeast Asian 
trading centers. The elite of the VOC not only ruled the town but was one of the most pow­
erful economic groups as well because the Company was at the same time a political and an 
economic organization. This elite not only made the decisions concerning the trading and 
fiscal affairs of the VOC but also earned considerable money on the side. The second most 
powerful economic group was the elite of the Chinese citizenry, which more or less domi­
nated the private sector.
As in all colonial societies race played an important role, for instance in access to power, 
in status, in marriage, and social stratification. The division of the non-VOC residents into 
European, Chinese, and indigenous citizenries draws attention to the considerable degree of 
formal administrative segregation. This segregation was, however, somewhat imperfect be­
cause (1) there were not enough Europeans or even mestizos to fill the ranks of the Euro­
pean citizenry, which consequently had to be filled with purely Asian ethnicities like Mar- 
dijkers and Makassarese and (2) the lack of European, mestizo, and Chinese women as mar­
riage partners for European and Chinese men, who consequently had to look for partners in 
the Southeast Asian migrant communities and not the least among attractive female slaves. 
Moreover, in Kota Ambon the imperfect administrative segregation was not paralleled by a 
spatial one because, in general, there were no special living quarters designed for specific 
ethnicities.
The colonial character of the internal structure of the city can be distinguished in the 
political domination by an European minority. In external relations, the colonial character 
expressed itself in the town's function as part of a commercial and political network set up 
to extract resources, in this case cloves, from a subject population. Moreover, the city was 
the channel through which all activities of the colonizers intended to control and to pene­
trate the indigenous society found their way. In short, the city linked the metropolis with 
the colonized population.53 By the middle of the seventeenth century, the Ambonese coun­
tryside had already changed substantially. The cultivation of cloves was brought under the 
VOC monopoly, the indigenous political landscape was reorganized to make control for the 
VOC easier, and part of the population was converted from nominal Catholicism to nominal 
Protestantism. These changes, however, could not be attributed to Kota Ambon's urban 
community as the promotor of change; the colonizing VOC was, of course, not a phenom­
enon exclusively limited to Kota Ambon. The decisions to promote the developments were 
only partially taken by Victoria's authorities. Far away, the directors in the Netherlands and 
the High Government in Batavia also played their parts in these processes.
A comparison of the results of this analysis with literature on other Dutch colonial cities 
in Asia during the period of the "Ancien regime" is interesting. The outstanding pioneer in 
this field of studies is, of course, De Haan, with his two-volume work on Batavia.54 His work 
has been so impressive that it was not until the 1970s that any new studies on this
53 A. D. King, "Colonial Cities: Global Pivots of Change," in Colonial Cities, pp. 13-15.
54 F. de Haan, Oud Batavia, 2 vols. (Batavia: Kolff, 1922).
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subject were undertaken. It is obvious that a substantial number of the phenomena found in 
Batavia can be traced in other settlements as well. Generally, this holds true for the multi­
ethnic composition of the population and the institutional structures, which always, to some 
extent, copied those of Batavia.
Jean Gelman Taylor, one of the authors who recently undertook to rewrite a volume on 
Batavia's history, draws attention to the role of the Asian-born women partners, particularly 
European and mestizo, of the Company servants in the field of linking "clans" in the higher 
ranks of the government.55 As Heather Sutherland has already pointed out, the role of these 
women in the struggle for power in Company circles must have been different in VOC set­
tlements outside Batavia because the most successful VOC employees only stayed in these 
places for a few years. Consequently, that role should have been more manifest within the 
permanently settled European citizen class.56 The data for mestizo marriage patterns, in 
Kota Ambon, numbers of slaves, and the positions of a Jan de Ruyter and a Frans Colijn, 
illustrate this situation. Obviously, as Taylor stresses, the women partners of the European 
citizens and Company servants were to a large extent bearers of a mestizo culture, defined 
as a mixed culture with several European and Asian elements.57 A mestizo influence on 
culture, with other elements, however, should also have been manifest within the Chinese 
citizenry, where many Chinese men married Balinese or Makassarese women. Finally, the 
other migrants, such as Mardijkers and Makassarese, must have been to a certain degree 
culturally drawn into a mestizo orbit as well, because after becoming Christians, they must 
have copied European values and habits. Apart from adopting the religion, for instance, 
they also changed their clothing and drinking habits.
Another historian of Batavia, Leonard Blusse, presents the reader with many original 
points of view. His point of departure is spatial: Batavia consisted of two parts, a castle and 
a town, the first a cornerstone in a European trading network and the second a keystone in 
the Southeast Asian trading and migratory network of the Chinese. In the castle lived the 
Europeans, who held the political power, and in the town Blusse depicts a Chinese mer­
chant community, which held the economic power. Demographically, the Chinese also 
should have been the dominant group.58 The picture of political power in the hands of the 
Dutch and economic power, to a large degree at least, in the hands of the Chinese was also 
the situation in Kota Ambon. From the point of view of demography, however, the Chinese 
were not dominant at all in Kota Ambon. Whether they were in Batavia, as Blusse states, 
depends on how one wants to interpret statistics, for it is obvious that the Chinese can only 
be called the dominant demographic ethnicity when slaves are not considered. When slaves 
are included, the Chinese amounted to only some 20 percent of the population. From 
Blusse's data it is not clear whether the marriage partners of the Chinese men, usually 
Balinese women, are included in this 20 percent. If these women and the majority of the 
slaves were basically of Southeast Asian origin, it is possible that Batavia, like Kota Ambon, 
must, demographically at least, have been a Southeast Asian migrant city as well.
55 J. Gelman Taylor, The Social World of Batavia. European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia (Madison: Wisconsin, 1983), 
pp. 34,50-51.
56 H. Sutherland, "Ethnicity, Wealth and Power in Colonial Makassar: A Historiographical Reconsideration," in 
The Indonesian City. Studies in Urban Development and Planning, ed. P.J.M. Nas Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk 
Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 117 (Dordrecht: Foris, 1986), p. 50.
57 Taylor, Social World, pp. 17-19.
58 Blusse, Strange Company, pp. 74, 83-84.
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VOC towns other than the capital, such as Colombo in Sri Lanka, Melaka in Malaysia, 
Zeelandia in Taiwan, and Makassar in Indonesia, have also attracted attention.59 Like Kota 
Ambon, these towns, in the second half of the seventeenth century, had populations of 
approximately 5,000. The article on Colombo, however, differs from the others, not only be­
cause that city falls outside the Southeast Asian setting but also because its main concern is 
demographic, leaving other aspects of urban history outside its focus. It describes the 
demographic situation of the 1694 intramuras population, which in Kota Ambon can be 
compared more or less with the VOC group and the European citizenry. It appears that the 
European and mestizo groups are similar in demographic behavior to those in Kota Am­
bon.60 On the periphery of Southeast Asia, the city of Zeelandia in Taiwan had a relatively 
short history: it was founded in 1624 and destroyed in 1662 by the Chinese warlord, Zheng 
Cheng-Zong. Blusse's concept of a Chinese colonial city under Dutch protection was no 
doubt more ideally realized in Zeelandia than in Batavia.61
In Melaka and Makassar situations similar to those in Kota Ambon and Batavia can be 
observed: the VOC elite held the political power and the town-governing institutions were 
originally Dutch but modified to the colonial situation and adapted with originally South­
east Asian phenomena such as a certain degree of autonomy for major ethnicities. The elite 
of the VOC played a considerable role in the economy as well. It appears, however, that the 
Chinese were, perhaps, economically not as strong as in Batavia or in Kota Ambon. In 
Melaka, they were held in check by Indians and Malays and, in Makassar, by Malays, all of 
them skillful trading communities that already played an important role before the arrival 
of the Dutch. Apparently, the Chinese did not meet an economic vacuum in these settle­
ments. It is highly probable that in Melaka, as in Makassar and Kota Ambon, the Southeast 
Asians were dominant in number. On the basis of the information put forward by Andaya it 
is, however, rather difficult to draw demographic conclusions. Sutherland presents further 
detail that facilitates closer comparison.62 One of the striking facts is that the sex-ratio 
among the adult population in Makassar was much more balanced than in Kota Ambon. A 
possible explanation could be that Makassar was located in a slave-supplying area, which 
made the recruitment of female partners for the male foreigners relatively easy. Assuming 
that the majority of the slaves in Makassar were of South Sulawesi origin, one can probably 
conclude that Kota Ambon where all slaves had to be imported, when compared to Makas­
sar, was a city with a much stronger migrant character.
59 G. J. Knaap, "Europeans, Mestizo's and Slaves: The Population of Colombo at the End of the Seventeenth Cen­
tury," Itinerario 5-2 (1981): 84-101; B. Watson Andaya, "Melaka under the Dutch," in Melaka. The Transformation o f 
a Malay Capital c. 1400-1980, ed. Kernial Singh Sandhu and P. Wheatley (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford, 1983) 1 :1 9 5 -  
241; Oosterhoff, "Zeelandia," pp. 51-63; Sutherland, "Makassar," pp. 37-55.
60 Knaap, "Colombo," pp. 88,91-96.
61 Oosterhoff, "Zeelandia," pp. 52,54-58.
62 Andaya, "Melaka," pp. 198-213; Sutherland, "Makassar," pp. 41-42,48-50.
Groundplan of Kota Ambon in the beginning of the eighteenth century.
From Fr. Valentijn, Oud- en Nieuw Oost-Indien, vol. 2 (Dordrecht: Van Braam, 1724), Ambonsche Zaaken.
Kota Ambon from the seaside in the 1660s.
From J. Nieuhof, Gedenckwaerdige Zee en Lantreize . . . Oost-Indien (Amsterdam: Van Meurs, 1682).
Mestizo woman. Makassarese man and woman.
From J. Nieuhof, Gedenckwaerdige Zee en Lantreize . . . Oost-Indien (Amsterdam: Van Meurs, 1682).
Mardijker man and woman.
From J. Nieuhof, Gedenckwaerdige Zee en Lantreize . . . Oost-Indien (Amsterdam: Van Meurs, 1682).
